Geoeconomics Group Conference 2026
Geoeconomics for Belgium – bringing together research and policy
29 January 2026 – Royal Military Academy, Rue Hobbema 8, 1000 Brussels
In an increasingly tumultuous world, geoeconomics has emerged as a key foreign policy tool for states to protect their national interests. For Belgium, with a globally integrated economy, this trend presents both opportunities and challenges.
The global rise of geoeconomics has prompted scholarly efforts to define the concept and analyse its use in policy. Simultaneously, policymakers have been confronted with the day-to-day task of both designing and responding to geoeconomic policies.
This conference aims to bridge the gap between academia and policymaking. Convening researchers from Belgian universities and research institutions working on geoeconomics, and policymakers from the Belgian federal and regional government services, it provides a platform for mutual learning and dialogue about geoeconomics. Through a mix of plenary sessions and thematic breakouts, it facilitates the dissemination of research insights and the articulation of policy priorities directly from practice.
Ultimately, the conference seeks to strengthen Belgium’s capacity to navigate the rise of geoeconomics and reinforce Belgian policy making on this increasingly important topic.
Register
Please register before Thursday 22nd of January 2026
Programme
14:10
Opening keynote
Welcome address
14:00
Registration
13:30
Prof. Dr. Cind Du Bois - Professor of Economics at the Royal Military Academy and Sciences Po Paris, counselor to the Minister of Defence
14:30
Expert panel
Panel with experts from government and the private sector on geoeconomic policy in Belgium (experts to be announced)
Thematical breakout sessions
15:30
The conference will convene in four breakout sessions on different topics. Attendants are required to choose one of the sessions to attend. After a brief introduction, researchers will present recent work on the specific topic and explain how their insights can be applied to policy. In the remainder of the session, the researchers and the attendants will further discuss how geoeconomic developments affect the policy domain.
Session 1: Trade
Session 2: Investment
Session 3: Industrial policy
Session 4: Maritime domain
Moderator: Victor Dedecker (Egmont)
Moderator: TBC
Moderator: Prof. Dr. Nikolas vander Vennet (VUB)
Moderator: Dr. Anne-Marie Dedene (VUB)
Dr. Sjorre Couvreur (RMA)
Dr. Dennis Essers (NBB)
Floor Doppen (Antwerp University)
Nick Houttekier (RMA/VUB)
Ruben De La Cruz (Ghent University)
Robin Schindowski (KU Leuven)
Dr. Pablo Muylle (Ghent University)
Magali Michiels (VUB)
Tijs ter Haar and Merel Jacobs (RMA/VUB)
Networking reception
17:00
18:00
End
Presentations
Dr. Sjorre Couvreur
Trade
Intensifying geopolitical competition between the US and China has drastically changed the global economic and regulatory environment, supply chain vulnerabilities exposed during COVID-19, or the weaponization of energy supplies by Russia, have severely impacted and disrupted business operations across the globe, and the EU. The reintegration of security and power considerations in the economic policy-making domain is often associated with the adoption and expansion of geoeconomic policies such as investment screening, sanctions, and export controls. Investment screening mechanisms are pieces of legislation that governments have adopted or expanded in the past decade to assess the security implications of certain (foreign) investments. This research focusses on the political economy determinants of the institutional choices governments made when adopting investment screening mechanisms, the role public and private economic actors played, and the interplay between economic ‘wants’ and security ‘needs’. Understanding the interplay of these different considerations has important implications for policy makers, but similarly, for analysts trying to understand policy decisions in a shifting geopolitical landscape.
Balancing security and investment in the EU: Past, present & future
Floor Doppen
Investment
As sanctions are believed to be a growing tool of economic statecraft in an increasingly geopolitically fragmented world, it is essential that their consequences are better understood, including any “collateral damage” for the countries imposing them. This research project studies the effect on Belgian trade of the European trade sanctions that were imposed on Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 -- one of the largest and most wide-ranging sanction packages to date. We exploit the richness, granularity and timeliness of administrative Belgian firm-level data to sketch the profile of Belgian firms that were trading with Russia at the eve of the new sanctions wave, and to evaluate how those firms have adapted. Our results show that, even before the invasion, overall Belgian trade exposures on Russia were relatively limited, and how the remaining Belgian trade with Russia has become even more concentrated in specific sectors and firms. Preliminary estimations indicate that firms’ initial trade exposures to Russia and to the sanctions do influence their trading behaviour at the extensive and intensive margins, but have no clear effect on total firm turnover.
The effect of sanctions against Russia on Belgian trade: firm-level evidence
Europe’s Geoeconomic Turn in Trade: Trends and Implications
This presentation offers an overview of the latest research on the European Union’s geoeconomic turn in trade policy. Whereas EU trade policy was long defined by openness, rules-based engagement, and market liberalisation, recent developments point to a more strategic use of economic instruments in response to geopolitical tensions, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and the weaponisation of interdependence. The talk outlines key trends along three dimensions: instrumental, with the rapid expansion of tools aimed at resilience, coercion-proofing, and strategic control; institutional, as competencies, coordination mechanisms, and decision-making processes evolve to support a more geoeconomic stance; and ethical, concerning the values, trade-offs, and legitimacy challenges that accompany this shift. I will conclude with a brief reflection on what this evolving landscape means for Belgium and how it can best protect its interests as a highly open economy.
Dr. Dennis Essers
Tijs ter Haar and Merel Jacobs
Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI) – including subsea cables, pipelines and offshore energy installations – forms the backbone of Europe’s digital connectivity and energy security. The Nord Stream sabotage in 2022 led to a paradigm shift underscoring the vulnerability of these assets to both willful and unintentional damage. While the Baltic Sea has drawn attention due to the repeated cable incidents, the North Sea too is emerging as strategic hotspot given its dense network of offshore wind farms, interconnectors and data cables. This paper applies Bueger and Edmunds’ maritime security toolbox to assess policy options for Belgium and its regional partners. It argues for a layered approach, combining strategy, informal cooperation, maritime situational awareness, operations, and capacity building. Recommendations include enhancing regional coordination through platforms like NorthSeal, investing in repair capacity, and strengthening legal frameworks for inspections and deterrence. By embedding resilience across public, private and multinational actors, North Sea states can anticipate and mitigate hybrid threats before they escalate.
Security (Critical) Infrastructure in the North Sea
Magali Michiels
Maritime domain
State aid, government subsidies to businesses, represents a major policy tool in Europe, with billions of euros distributed annually to support innovation, employment, and regional development. But does it actually work? Using a unique dataset linking European Commission records to financial data from over 63,000 firms across 20 EU countries, we provide the first comprehensive evaluation of state aid's impact on firm performance. Our findings challenge conventional wisdom: on average, firms receiving state aid experience declining productivity, profitability, and output in the years following support. However, the story is more nuanced. Business-oriented aid, targeting R&D, innovation, and training, shows positive effects on productivity. Aid also works better when sufficiently large relative to firm size and when directed to manufacturing rather than services. We complement this EU-wide analysis with an in-depth examination of Belgium's offshore wind energy sector, where 45 firms received €1.04 billion in state aid between 2016-2022. Here, we observe significant heterogeneity: while, on average, we observe strong post-aid growth in value added and employment, some recipients experience decline, suggesting that firm characteristics and project implementation matter enormously.
Dr. Pablo Muylle
From Support to Success? Evaluating the Firm-Level Effects of State Aid in Europe (and Belgium's Offshore Wind Sector)
The European Union (EU), seeking strategic autonomy in a geoeconomic world, is increasingly wary of technological dependence on third states. Concerned these dependencies could be weaponized, the EU wields industrial policy to boost domestic production of strategic technologies. A flagship industrial policy tool are Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs). Through these cross-border projects, member states subsidize firms for research and development (R&D) and production of microelectronics, batteries, cloud computing, and hydrogen. Interestingly, participation in IPCEIs varies widely among EU member states. Companies in contributing countries profit from the nearly 37.6 billion EUR in IPCEI state aid, while firms in neighboring states do not—threatening fair competition in the European single market. This quest for European unity risks devolving into an intra-European subsidy race in which capitals prioritize their national champions. As a small open economy in the heart of Europe with limited fiscal firepower, Belgium and its industry faces the risk of falling behind in this race. This session explores the challenges and opportunities for Belgium and its industries, offering policy recommendations to navigate the EU’s IPCEI framework and broader industrial strategy.
Robin Schindowski
The Conceptual Architecture of China's Industrial Policy
The European Union (EU), seeking strategic autonomy in a geoeconomic world, is increasingly wary of technological dependence on third states. Concerned these dependencies could be weaponized, the EU wields industrial policy to boost domestic production of strategic technologies. A flagship industrial policy tool are Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs). Through these cross-border projects, member states subsidize firms for research and development (R&D) and production of microelectronics, batteries, cloud computing, and hydrogen. Interestingly, participation in IPCEIs varies widely among EU member states. Companies in contributing countries profit from the nearly 37.6 billion EUR in IPCEI state aid, while firms in neighboring states do not—threatening fair competition in the European single market. This quest for European unity risks devolving into an intra-European subsidy race in which capitals prioritize their national champions. As a small open economy in the heart of Europe with limited fiscal firepower, Belgium and its industry faces the risk of falling behind in this race. This session explores the challenges and opportunities for Belgium and its industries, offering policy recommendations to navigate the EU’s IPCEI framework and broader industrial strategy.
Ruben De La Cruz
IPCEIs in Europe’s Industrial Policy: Challenges and Opportunities for Belgium
Industrial policy
Foreign acquisitions have become an important part of the global economy, worrying governments about their security implications. Yet,
the question if foreign investors can harm national security and, if so, how and under what conditions, remains understudied. This article
proposes a new theoretical framework to analyze the security aspects of acquisitions by foreign investors. The framework consists of three
dimensions: the relation between the home and the host state, the nature of the acquisition, and the link between the home state and the
acquired firm. We apply the framework to recent Chinese acquisitions in Belgium to illustrate its mechanics and show how it arrives at different security evaluations on different investment cases. Overall, the analysis shows that acquisitions by foreign investors can have security consequences, but only under specific conditions. The article contributes to the understanding of the effectiveness of weaponizing
interdependence, the reasons for investment screening, and the geoeconomic role of non-state actors.
Nick Houttekier
Can Foreign Investors Harm National Security?